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F. HODGE O'NEAL SYMPOSIUM ON
CORPORATE LAW AND FINANCE
FOREWORD-EVOLVING BUSINESS
ASSOCIATIONS: UNDERSTANDING
THE ROLE OF LAW
ROBERT B. THOMPSON*
Corporations law, at least from the time of Berle and Means, has been
based on a stylized model of a large enterprise with many passive share-
holders, each owning a small portion of the total ownership interest.
Doubt about the continued applicability of this model in an era of institu-
tional investors' holding large blocks of stock has provoked a flurry of
scholarly critique' and may yet lead to change in our legal structure re-
garding corporations.2 This recent scholarship broadens an ongoing de-
bate elsewhere in corporations law. The effort to modify law for business
* Professor of Law, Washington University.
1. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REv. 520
(1990) (stylized facts, never wholly true, are today simply false); Alfred F. Conard, Beyond
Managerialism: Investor Capitalism?, 22 U. MICH. J.L. RE. 117 (1988) (examining the potential
power of investment institutions); Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance,
91 COLUM. L. REv. 10 (1991) (discussing laws and regulations that have limited the role of institu-
tional shareholders).
2. In June 1991, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposed changes to several
proxy rules that would have facilitated a greater institutional role in the proxy process. The SEC
presented the proposal as the first of a series of possible rulemaking initiatives relating to the proxy
solicitation process. See Exchange Act Release No. 29,315, [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 84,811 (June 17, 1991). The proposal sparked an unanticipated number of comments
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forms that do not fit the stylized model has long been a defining feature
of close corporations law. More recently, the deluge of management
buyouts and other going-private transactions has produced a whole new
set of enterprises that do not fit the stylized model and that therefore
require further adaptations of the traditional law.
This Symposium presents an array of provocative articles and com-
mentary addressing law as applied to close corporations and going-pri-
vate enterprises. These articles define anew how we think about the
business firm and also offer guidance for defining the role of law and
private ordering for all business enterprises. The Symposium contains
written versions of presentations made at a conference held in St. Louis
on November 8 and 9, 1991. The conference was jointly sponsored by
the School of Law and the Center for Business Law and Economics of
the John M. Olin School of Business of Washington University. This
Symposium is a fitting tribute to F. Hodge O'Neal, whose innovative
work highlighted the need to recognize that not all enterprises fit within
assumed statutory norms. As Professor O'Neal pointed out, variations
from these statutory norms require increased private ordering to plan
around undesired statutory rules and greater attention to problems cre-
ated in the absence of planning when these statutory laws are applied to
business enterprises for which they were not designed.3
I. CLOSE CORPORATIONS
Statutory law traditionally did not address the different needs of enter-
prises with a small number of investors intimately involved in the opera-
tion of the business and lacking a public market for their shares. All
investors were presumed to desire the normal corporate attributes of sep-
aration of function between owners and managers, centralized power in
the board of directors, and decisions by majority rule. Indeed, those
shareholders who sought to modify these rules (for example, to limit by
and the SEC backed off this initiative in November, saying it would repropose the rules at some
future date. See Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 46, at 1669-70 (Nov. 22, 1991).
3. Professor O'Neal's treatise, Close Corporations: Law and Practice, first published in 1958,
has a strong planning perspective, guiding lawyers for close corporations in the steps necessary to
permit the closely held enterprise to modify the assumed corporate form. See F. HODGE O'NEAL &
ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE (3d ed. 1988)
[hereinafter CLOSE CORPORATIONS]. His treatise, Oppression of Minority Shareholders, first pub-
lished in 1975, addresses a variety of shareholder disputes including going-private transactions. See
F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION Or MINORITY SHAREHOLD-
ERS (2d ed. 1985).
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contract the majority shareholder's power to discharge a minority inves-
tor) met with judicial insistence on traditional norms.4 In the past forty
years, however, legislatures and courts have come to appreciate attrib-
utes unique to the closely held business and have both permitted and
encouraged a distinctive body of law fitted to the needs of these
enterprises. 5
As close corporations law has evolved, it has often been somewhat dis-
tinct from the main body of corporations law. In contrast, the first two
principal articles in this Symposium illustrate the interconnection of
close corporations law to the larger inquiry using close corporations to
discuss game theory and the relative roles for courts and legislatures.
Ian Ayres uses a familiar line of close corporations cases to tell a
broader story about the relative efficiency of courts and legislatures in
dealing with close corporations issues. This story becomes a means to
explore whether there is tension between two frequent assertions of law
and economics scholars: (1) corporations statutory law is efficient, (a
race to the top theory); and (2) common law is efficient. By examining
judicial decisions nullifying statutory intent and statutes overriding judi-
cial decisions, Ayres probes the relative efficiencies of the two laws. His
assertion of the relative inefficiency of legislatures in crafting rules for
close corporation governance draws the attention of two noted commen-
tators in this area, Roberta Romano and Geoffrey Miller. Miller asserts
that both statutory and common law are efficient for close corporations.
Romano suggests that the two are at least complimentary and tend to-
ward efficiency.
That debate is informative, but there may be more value to Ayres'
points that do not directly address that question. Romano restates the
inquiry as whether corporate grievances are more likely to be brought to
courts or to legislatures. As Ayres' article suggests, the answer is courts.
After a falling out among participants, the weaker party, typically the
minority shareholder, often ends up with little or no return on an illiquid
investment, a result contrary to that for which the parties bargained.
The parties' bounded rationality thus has created a gap best filled by
courts after the fact.
Ayres' suggestion that the legislature is more likely to reflect the inter-
est of majority parties stirs calls from the commentators for additional
4. See, eg., McQuade v. Stoneham, 189 N.E. 234 (N.Y. 1934).
5. See O'NEAL & THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 3 (chapter 1 details the
distinctive needs of close corporations).
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empirical research; his conclusion, however, is not surprising. His point
that close corporation law may be distorted to protect public corporation
law deserves broader recognition. It is sometimes difficult to distinguish
the intentional lumping of close corporations with public corporations
from an uninformed application of public corporation law to close corpo-
rations. Either case distorts close corporations law. An example is a
recent Arizona case involving a fight for control of a close corporation
between two factions of the same family, each owning about half of the
company's shares.6 The state appellate court cited a host of public cor-
poration takeover decisions, all strongly protective of the board's prerog-
ative to direct this enterprise, to resolve the dispute with no recognition
that the enterprise was nothing like the publicly held corporations seen in
the cases cited by the court.
Jason Scott Johnston addresses the role for courts and markets in bal-
ancing the possibility that the majority shareholders in a close corpora-
tion will misuse corporate powers against the possibility that the
minority will file bad faith, opportunistic lawsuits asserting oppression or
breach of fiduciary duty. Johnston approaches this central problem in
corporate law from a game theory perspective, not heretofore used in the
close corporation context. He challenges the simple conclusion (of what
he terms the "perfect market" analysis) that ex ante private bargaining is
better than judicial resolution imposed ex post. He asserts that this anal-
ysis fails to examine seriously the strategic limitations on the terms par-
ties can agree to ex ante, and he offers a contract proposal game as an
alternative.
Johnston's analysis suggests less need for an expansive fiduciary duty
in symmetrical partnerships if the parties bargain with sophisticated legal
representatives and a sophisticated awareness of the possibility for oppor-
tunistic behavior. He finds a judicially applied "reasonable expectations"
standard is appropriate for closely held corporations, however, because
of the strategic problems of contracting for an expansion of fiduciary ob-
ligations in that setting. Charles O'Kelley's commentary suggests that
Johnston might broaden the focus of the game by including the initial
selection of business form, which is inextricably linked to whatever bar-
gaining later occurs about fiduciary duty. From this perspective,
O'Kelley finds Johnston's analysis more useful as a gapfilling theory for
6. Schoen v. Schoen, 804 P.2d 787 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990).
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discrete transactions between strangers than for long-term relationa>
contracts.
John Hetherington questions whether business participants will have
the knowledge of their own (and their co-venturers') predatory proclivi-
ties to divide good from bad entrepreneurs for Johnston's model. Heth-
erington would focus on who should bear the costs of mutual antagonism
after the loss of mutual confidence as the motives and behaviors change
in an ongoing relationship. He suggests that the hostility of the Perfect-
Markets analysis to providing legal relief preserves the vulnerability of
the disadvantaged within the closely held business relationship. Protec-
tion of minority shareholders' expectations after a falling out between the
parties, in Hetherington's view, supports both greater productivity and
an economically more just society.
The growth in state statutes authorizing limited liability companies il-
lustrates legislative encouragement of participants' desire to expand the
choices of business forms. This budding means of organization lets firms
adopt limited liability without the tax costs found in the corporate form.7
The growing adoption of statutes permitting this form may test Ian Ay-
res' assertion that states do not compete for close corporation charters
and may expand the contract proposal game Jason Johnston advances.
Larry Ribstein takes a different approach, staking out a broad claim that
the partnership form is attractive for many firms on the margin only be-
cause the regulatory costs of limited liability, including double corporate
taxation and limitations on organizational form, make incorporation too
expensive. His prediction of the possible death of partnership is provoca-
tive in itself; his thesis also illustrates a broader theme in business as-
sociations law in its suggestion of a more limited role for regulation
generally, and in particular for regulation as to unlimited liability. The
move to limited liability companies with reduced liability for business
participants thus parallels some of the recent proposals to revise the Uni-
form Partnership Act and changes in state corporations statutes to per-
mit corporations to limit their directors' liabilities for breaches of the
duty of care.8
Ribstein argues that a firm's possible use of limited liability to exter-
nalize tort costs does not justify restricting the availability of limited lia-
7. See generally Robert R. Keatinge et a]., The Limited Liability Company: A Study of the
Emerging Entity, 47 Bus. LAW. (forthcoming 1992).
8. See generally Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Revised Model Business Cor-
poration Act-Amendment Pertaining to the Liability of Directors, 45 Bus. LAW. 695 (1990).
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bility. This argument carries him into the current debate over efforts to
remove limited liability for corporate participants, at least for torts.9
Robert Hillman takes direct issue with Ribstein's point, asserting that the
potential for externalities justifies restrictions on limited liability and ar-
guing against a unitary analysis of limited liability that does not distin-
guish public from closely held firms. Saul Levmore's recognition that
enormous numbers of actors have gravitated toward tax-disfavored clas-
sifications makes him less inclined than Ribstein to assume that regula-
tion, taxation, or tort liability are always suspect, and more inclined to
look at competition between states and competition between interest
groups within states. As Levmore poses the question, we will have to
look further to see if limited liability companies are a frontier-expanding
innovation or the unfortunate product of interest-group politics.
II. GOING PRIVATE AND MANAGEMENT BUYOUTS
The seemingly mass movement in the 1980s by which management
and investment groups purchased the equity interests of public share-
holders did not create a new form of doing business. It did provoke a
lively debate as to how law should respond to the frequent changes in the
form by which individual firms do business. This conference brought
together two economists whose empirical work suggests skepticism about
regulating these transactions, and two lawyers skeptical of the transac-
tions without regulation. Steve Kaplan, whose studies are printed else-
where, has produced significant empirical work illustrating that many
firms in going-private transactions return to public ownership in a fairly
short time.10 The empirical work of Jeffrey Davis and Ken Lehn
(presented by Lehn at this conference) questions the value of required
disclosure in going-private transactions. The conference presented an en-
gaging interchange between the economists and the two legal scholars on
the panel: Al Sommer, who as an SEC Commissioner in 1974 propelled
the going-private debate into the public spotlight,1 and Victor Brudney,
who has previously suggested that some management initiated transac-
9. See, e.g., David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLtUM. L.
RnV. 1565 (1991); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability
for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991).
10. See Steven N. Kaplan, The Staying Power of Leveraged Buyouts, 29 J. FIN. ECON. 287
(1991) (many firms taken private go public again within a few years); Steven N. Kaplan & Jeremy C.
Stein, The Evolution of Buyout Pricing and Financial Structure (National Bureau of Economic Res-
search Working Paper No. 3695, May 1991).
11. A.A. Sommer, Jr., "Going Private:" A Lesson in Corporate Responsibility, Law Advisory
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tions ought to be banned. 2
The discussion that followed the panelists' presentations highlighted
the different perspectives brought to this problem. The excerpt that fol-
lows begins with a comment from Philip Dybvig, John M. Simon Profes-
sor of Finance at Washington University, as to the relative value of each
empirical work. Dybvig's observation on differences between valuation
as seen by shareholders and as seen by managers brings the lawyers on
the panel into the discussion:
Phil Dybvig: I put a lot more faith in numbers like Steve's previous study
rather than just looking at the premium because you are trying to measure
the difference between the price that the managers are paying and the true
value. And what Ken is measuring in his studies is the difference between
the price before the buyout compared to what the manager paid....
I think what Steve does is closer. I do think that there is a separate issue
which is that the intrinsic value as perceived by the inside manager is much
different from the intrinsic value as perceived by the market. And it would
be nice to know how the increase is split up between that difference. That is
something that we just can't measure. That's very important to these
values.
Al Sommer: I think that's an important point. Take your John Kluge case.
Now, I don't know if the value changed in the two years between the time
that he took the company private and the time he sold off all the assets, but
my guess would be that.., the company could have sold off those assets at
the time of the going-private transaction at significant premiums over what
they were carried on the books at or reflected in the value in the market. So
there was a value there. The market didn't recognize it. So I .... as a
shareholder of Metromedia, look at that value and see it in terms of the
stock market because I don't really expect that anybody is going to take
measures such as he took to realize the values. I didn't expect the company
to sell off their assets. I don't invest with the expectation of that and I don't
hold the stock with the expectation of that. So there is a value in there that
is only going to be realized if somebody takes the initiative to sell off those
assets. So he does it; but he does it after going private so that he gets the
benefit of it .... You have this value that is imbedded in there and the
measure that the shareholder uses as to how much benefit he's getting and
whether it's enough is in terms of what he sees as the market price-what
he can sell it for. Now, there is where the whole thing leaves me con-
Council Lecture, Notre Dame Law School (Nov. 1974), in [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 80,010 (Nov. 20, 1974).
12. Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE
L.J. 1354, 1365-70 (1978).
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fused.... [M]uch of the value could be realized in the context of a publicly
held company. And why doesn't management do it?
Steve Kaplan: Why did Dick Munro do the Time- Warner deal when two
years later the stock price is at ninety dollars, and he could have had two
hundred dollars? Why did Ross Johnson have an air force?
Victor Brudney: If you ask me why does he do it, he isn't doing it for me. I
happen to be a Time stockholder. He certainly isn't doing it for my benefit.
Steve Kaplan: The point there is that there are some managements who
will do it. And there are other managements who won't. How do you get
changes? Let's say Ross Johnson decides I'm going to change RJR Nabisco
without an LBO .... And people kind of scratch their heads and go:
"Why are you doing this? We are a profitable company." I am not saying
this is true in all cases. And there are clearly bad LBOs.... But, there are
situations where... you do this and it sends a really strong signal to the
whole organization that things are going to change. And you can do things
that would be harder to do without that big shock....
Phil Dybvig: There is hardly a management signal that would be more
costly to the shareholders. This is incredibly costly ... This is saying in
order to do what's good for the shareholders I have to take away forty
percent of the value.... There ought to be some way to send a signal to the
employees without saying, "well the only way I can signal the employees
that we're serious about this is for me to take two-thirds of the firm value
and put it in my pocket."
Steve Kaplan: You're taking a chunk of it and you are also giving a chunk
to the public shareholders.
Victor Brudney: If shareholders understand this should they charge more
for their capital? In a perfect market we'll equilibrate won't we? ... If
investors know that it is not the economic increment in the value of the
enterprise that is all theirs, but that at a certain point an indeterminate
amount of it can be appropriated by managers for themselves.., they'll
charge more for capital, isn't that right?
Steve Kaplan: They know that.
Victor Brudney: Do they? ... Let me put it another way: if the market
knows it then there is surely no harm in stating it explicitly ex ante; but I
don't see anybody rushing to do that.
Steve Kaplan: No. But this is why. This is the rationale behind the SEC or
the Exchange that has allowed you to do a dual class-to have two classes
of stock-if you are doing an IPO [Initial Public Offering] rather than do-
ing two classes of stock (midstream).
Victor Brudney: I am not sure you are proving your point with that.
Steve Kaplan: If you are doing it ex ante people will understand that one
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class of stock has no voting rights. So management can do whatever they
want to you and those shares are typically priced.
Victor Brudney: Why are you reluctant to have it stated explicitly? You
say it's understood. You say, well here's another mechanism that shows it.
Steve Kaplan: It's explicit. You don't have voting rights. What's more
explicit than that?
Victor Brudney: That doesn't say that you can expropriate.... We ought
to know why there can't be an explicit statement about the exposure to a
risk of division at the end of the hunt.
Deborah DeMott: Or to use the rollup example.... Why doesn't the SEC
require that each prospectus for a new publicly offered limited partnership
say up front "an additional thing you should know is we can roll you up?"
Why resist that?
A! Sommer: Having once been a guardian of "The Holy Grail" of disclo-
sure, I don't really have much faith in it. I don't think it would change
people's investment decisions at all if they saw that emblazoned on the front
page of the prospectus, because the salesman would overcome the effects of
that very quickly.
Just as limited liability companies provide the format to discuss some
of the current close corporations issues, partnership rollups provide a
timely vehicle to discuss many of the problems involved in management
buyouts. Deborah DeMott provides the first detailed scholarly look at
these transactions. As she described it in the panel discussion that fol-
lowed the presentations:
These are really "small fry." These are funny little types of investment. It's
a small kind of change-of-control transaction overall. There was an enor-
mous amount of initial disclosure-ex ante disclosure as well as disclosure
at the point of the rollup. It's nonetheless intriguing to me that this alone
among the phenomena that we talked about this afternoon looks like it's
going to lead to Congressional legislation. A committee staff member on
the House Subcommittee told me that the Subcommittee had received more
investor complaints with regard to rollups than anything else they had
worked on in the institutional memory of the committee staff, including
penny stocks, leveraged buyouts, IPOs.... I... would have predicted if
this were an appropriately competitive capital market in the way that it
functioned, it surely should be possible for a limited partnership sponsor to
bond itself to investors in such a way as to preclude the possibility of this
kind of transaction.
Though these transactions currently may seem on the edge of regula-
tory discussions, they may provide the vehicle for working out larger
issues, including the familiar debate over federal preemption of state reg-
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ulation of business associations. Legislation proposed, but not passed, in
the last Congress would have provided appraisal rights for investors in a
rollup,13 an issue previously left to state corporations law. The relative
importance of state and federal law for resolving corporations issues has
continually fluctuated during the last sixty years. We are now at a point
at which state law occupies a larger role than it did a generation ago, and
federal courts seem increasingly inclined to limit federal law to disclo-
sure.14 Congressional action to establish federal appraisal rights for in-
vestors in rollups would clearly indicate that the move to limit federal
fights for business entities has reached its apogee.
Many going-private or management buyout transactions present diffi-
cult issues as to the role of investment bankers and their fairness opin-
ions. As Dale Oesterle notes in his commentary, the worst abuses
associated with fairness opinions have occurred in LBOs of publicly
traded firms: this topic thus in some ways extends the previous discus-
sion. Courts have occasionally questioned the role of investment bankers
and their fees, but efforts to impose liability on investment bankers have
not progressed very far. Ted Fiflis provides a theory by which these in-
vestment bankers might be held responsible to shareholders as gatekeep-
ers. William Carney challenges Fiffis' plan, stating that contracts,
markets, independent directors, and courts willing to set aside unfair
transactions will provide protection for shareholders without the need for
the liability Fiflis suggests. Oesterle's position is between these two, pro-
viding a useful exchange of views on this topic. Murray Weidenbaum's
address links this discussion of investment bankers to the debate over
going-private transactions. Weidenbaum's experience as an academic, a
government official, and a director in various corporations gives him a
distinct perspective on the takeovers of the last ten years, and he uses
that experience to speak frankly about some of these transactions.
Justice Andrew G.T. Moore II of the Delaware Supreme Court, the
author of many of that court's recent takeover opinions, provides an
overview for the entire legal discussion of these issues with his retrospec-
tive of the 1980s and the key Delaware corporate decisions of that dec-
ade. Moore suggests that the 1980s might be viewed as only a gold-
plated age of corporate law rather than a golden age of corporate law and
13. See, eg., Stark Bill Would Encourage Dissenters' Rights In Rollups, See. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) No. 17, at 599 (Apr. 26, 1991).
14. See, eg., The Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (finding SEC
Rule 19c-4 to be beyond the powers delegated to the Commission).
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he notes that the luster is wearing off. His review of Smith v. Van
Gorkom, Unocal, Revlon and Paramount identifies the role of the court
in the takeover process and focuses on how the court's decisions have
changed the role of directors.
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